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Integrity in democratic politics1 
 
Integrity is commonly seen as a SURSHUW\ RI FKDUDFWHU WKDW LV ¶PRVW
REYLRXVO\H[KLELWHGLQDSHUVRQ·VUHVLVWDQFHWRVDFULILFLQJRUFRPSURPLVLQJ
his FRQYLFWLRQV· 6FKHUNRVNH   Troublingly, this suggests that 
successful politicians cannot have integrity because accomplishing things 
in politics often requires sacrifices or compromises of this sort. However, 
many of us do believe that some politicians display integrity if they 
commit to various public-spirited ends throughout their career, while 
others lack it if they violate WKHSXEOLF·VWUXVW, sell-out their commitments 
for material rewards, or capitulate on their convictions too easily in the 
face of political opposition. Are we mistaken? I think not. To see why, we 
need to ask if there is such a thing as a distinctive kind of political 
integrity that can play an important role in our assessment of political 
conduct. In this article, I argue that there is and that it can make sense of 
our judgment that some politicians do act with integrity, even if they 
engage in certain kinds of behaviour which clash with the common view 
of integrity described above.  
Taking various codes of political ethics in the United Kingdom as my 
starting point, I examine the extent to which we can understand political 
integrity as a matter of politicians adhering to the obligations that official 
codes of ethics prescribe and, in a more general sense, the public-service 
                                                 
1 This hasn·t yet been copy edited yet but thought I·d send it in anyway so it can be read in this 
reading round.  
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ethos that underpins these codes. I argue that although this way of 
approaching the issue usefully draws our attention to an important class 
of positional duties that apply to politicians, commitment to principled 
political causes plays a further, indispensable role in coherent assessments 
of political integrity. In consequence, I claim that politicians of integrity 
succeed in furthering their deepest political commitments while avoiding 
malfeasance or misconduct. As such, the ascription of political integrity 
can often only be made when assessing a long train of action. 
My focus on integrity differs from other approaches in political ethics 
which are concerned with articulating general principles which underpin 
good conduct. Rather than formulating specific principles that ought to 
guide conduct, I am concerned with describing a virtue of character that 
admirable politicians display. Integrity is one of a number of such virtues; 
other obvious examples include loyalty and responsibility. There is no 
reason to think integrity exhausts discussions of political conduct, or that it 
is inherently more important than these other values. Rather, judgements 
DERXW D SROLWLFLDQ·V integrity are one of a number of considerations that 
plays a role in the all-things-considered evaluations that we make about 
politicians from an ethical perspective.   
Examining the nature of political integrity is valuable because the term 
is frequently invoked in public discussions of political ethics, but often in 
sharply conflicting ways. Members of the public often rebuke politicians 
for lacking integrity if they fail to act in what they consider to be a 
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fundamentally moral manner; by being less than truthful or for engaging 
in compromises on matters of principle. Many politicians, on the other 
hand, happily assert that they have acted with integrity if they have 
merely avoided HQULFKLQJWKHPVHOYHVDWWKHSXEOLF·VH[SHQVH2 I will argue 
that both of these ways of thinking about political integrity are 
problematic. If we are to continue to invoke the value of integrity in our 
discussions of political conduct, we need to think more realistically about 
the nature of politics, and in more sophisticated terms about the ways in 
which politicians can fail to match up to the demands of their profession. 
 
I 
As noted at the outset, in normal circumstances when we claim that a 
friend or colleague, for example, is a person of integrity, we assert that 
they show a particular kind of commitment to a set of principles, values, 
or ideals. Integrity is consequently often painted as a matter of ´VWDQGLQJ
IRUVRPHWKLQJµ, in the sense that WKHSHUVRQRI LQWHJULW\UHIXVHV WR ¶WUDGH
action on their own views too cheaply for gain, status, reward, approval, 
or for the escape from penalties, loss of status, disapproval >DQG VR RQ@·
(Calhoun, 1995, 6). On this view, a person paradigmatically betrays a lack 
of integrity if they abandon their values when they are met with 
opposition or temptation. The person of integrity, on the other hand, 
                                                 
2 For an excellent discussion of how FLWL]HQV·H[SHFWDWLRQVRISROLWLFDOFRQGXFW differ from 
SROLWLFLDQ·Vsee Allen and Birch 2015.  
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displays an integrated self as there is a basic continuity between their values 
and actions.3         
The types of commitments one can trade action on vary. If a business 
owner with an ethical opposition to nepotism refuses to offer her nephew 
a job despite familial pleading, we would describe her as person of 
integrity, just as we would so describe an academic who defied 
departmental pressure to pass substandard work. As this latter example 
illustrates, the commitments that we expect a person to stand for can 
derive from an understanding of the duties they inherit when they agree 
to perform a certain professional role. A psychoanalyst would lack 
integrity if she routinely slept with her patients, although we would not 
make the same claim about a barmaid who slept with her customers, 
because there is something about the psychoanalyst-patient relationship 
which ensures that certain role-specific sexual standards apply to it and 
these standards GRQ·WDSSO\WREDUmaids.   
This suggests that one possible avenue for grasping the nature of 
political integrity lies in focusing on DSROLWLFLDQ·Vpropensity to resist the 
temptation to contravene the specific obligations that apply to them as 
politicians for gain, status, reward, approval and so on. This approach is 
essentially adopted in WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP·V Code of Conduct for Members of 
Parliament, which specifies four duties which Members of Parliament 
(MPs) should acknowledge in order to preserve the integrity of 
                                                 
3 $V0DUWLQ%HQMDPLQQRWHV¶,QGLYLGXDOLQWHJULW\«UHTXLUHVWKDWRQH·VZRUGVDQGGHHGV
generally be true to a substantive, coherent, and relatively stable set of values and 
SULQFLSOHVWRZKLFKRQHLVJHQXLQHO\DQGIUHHO\FRPPLWWHG·-52). 
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Parliament. The first two address duties to (1) abide by the declaration of 
allegiance to the Crown and (2) uphold the law. MPs are also (3) said to 
KDYHDGXW\WR¶DFWLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIWKHQDWLRQDVDZKROHDQGDVSHFLDO
GXW\ WR WKHLU FRQVWLWXHQWV·, and to (4) ¶DFW RQ DOO RFFDVLRQV LQ DFFRUGDQFH
with WKHSXEOLFWUXVWSODFHGLQWKHP·ZKHUHWKLVLVWDNHQWRPHDQWKDW¶WKH\
should always behave with probity and integrity, including in their use of 
SXEOLFUHVRXUFHV·+RXVHRI&RPPRQV7KLVODWWHUXVHRIWKHWHUP
integrity is problematic, because it ensures that MPs have effectively been 
told that they can preserve the integrity of the House by acting with 
probity and integrity, and this is rather confusing. Yet the basic rationale 
behind the Code of Conduct is easily discerned. If MPs prioritise their 
private interests over the interests of those they serve, they violate the 
trust that is placed in them. As a result, their integrity, and the integrity of 
the House, is threatened. On such an account, political integrity should be 
understood in broadly negative terms; as a matter of not violating the 
SXEOLF·V trust by engaging in various kinds of malfeasance.   
This schematic account is given more determinate content in the 
Principles of Public Life that were originally published in 1995 which list 
integrity as one of seven key principles.4 According to Mark Philp, the 
&KDLU RI WKH 5HVHDUFK $GYLVRU\ %RDUG WR WKH 8.·V &RPPLWWHH RQ
Standards in Public Life, the Principles DUH LQWHQGHG WR FRYHU ¶standards, 
rules, norms and precepts that relate to the roles and functions that 
political office serves and the concomitant responsibilities that incumbents 
                                                 
4 Alongside selflessness, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership.  
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RI RIILFH XQGHUWDNH WR IXOILO·. Philp claims that the Principles should be 
XQGHUVWRRGDV ¶VWDQGDUGVWKDW WKRVH LQSXEOLFRIILFHPXVWUHVSHFW LQWheir 
capacity as holders of public office·, rather than as more general personality 
traits. Indeed, thinking that the Principles necessarily refer to personality 
traits, PLVWDNHVWKH¶SHUVRQZLWKWKHRIILFHKROGHU·, DQGIDLOV¶WRGLVWLQJXLVK
between a judgment about what sort of person he or she is, and a 
MXGJPHQWDERXWZKDWVRUWRIRIILFHKROGHUKHRUVKHLV· (Philp, 2014, 5).  On 
this view, a wide array of conduct may be irrelevant to our judgement of 
whether a politician has met the demands of public office.  
The Principles were revised in 2013. Integrity is now officially described 
in the following way:  
Holders of public office must avoid placing themselves under any obligation 
to people or organisations that might try inappropriately to influence them 
in their work. They should not act or take decisions in order to gain financial 
or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends. They 
must declare and resolve any interests and relationships (Committee on 
Standards in Public Life, 2013a, 24).  
 
On this reading, political integrity is a matter of politicians resisting some 
form of corruption by third parties. Cash for access scandals are 
illustrative examples of failures of political integrity of this kind. For 
example, in 2013 the Conservative MP Patrick Mercer accepted £4,000 to 
represent an organisation calling itself Friends of Fiji, which claimed to be 
campaigning for the readmission of Fiji into the Commonwealth. Mercer 
submitted five parliamentary questions, an Early Day Motion, and sought 
to create an All-3DUW\ 3DUOLDPHQWDU\ *URXS RQ )LML·V UHDGPLVVLRQ
However, Friends of Fiji was a fake FRPSDQ\ VHW XS E\ WKH %%&·V
7 
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Panorama television show in collaboration with the Daily Telegraph (BBC 
News 2013).  
This episode is instructive because although Mercer was not charged 
with any criminal wrongdoing, the Committee on Standards was 
explicitly tasked with asking if he broke the code of conduct for MPs, and 
damaged the integrity of the House. It found that Mercer evaded rules 
about registration and declaration, and broke the rules against paid 
advocacy, concluding that he inflicted significant reputational damage on 
the House (House of Commons 2014, 4; 6; 53). Hence, although the report 
does not explicitly state that Mercer displayed a lack of political integrity, 
given the earlier linkage of integrity with a concern for the reputation of 
the House, the judgement is tantamount to saying as much.  
How satisfactory is it to think about the nature of integrity in politics 
along the lines set out by the Principles of Public Life? Not very, is the short 
answer. If the politician of integrity recognises that they have a duty to act 
in accordance with the public trust placed in them, we ought to endorse a 
far more wide-ranging understanding of the kinds of action they must 
refrain from. A more theoretically consistent approach to understanding 
political integrity in these terms, would not only hold that a politician 
displays a lack of integrity if they inappropriately try to influence the 
political process for material gain, as Mercer did, but also if they engage in 
electoral fraud, make purposefully deceptive statements about their 
8 
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opponents and their policies5, or cheat on their expenses.6 In all of these 
cases, politicians subvert various democratic procedures or ends which we 
think secure the common good, and correspondingly fail to stand for the 
values of public service we expect them to affirm. Thus, at a minimum, a 
more adequate understanding of political integrity as a matter of 
complying with external standards of conduct, and the public service 
ethos which underpins it, would have to operate with a more capacious 
understanding of the myriad ways that politicians can betray the trust that 
is placed in them.  
Even though this is a more robust way of understanding what is 
LQYROYHGLQQRWYLRODWLQJWKHSXEOLF·VWUXVWLWLV still an overly narrow way 
of thinking about what political integrity requires. Consider a situation in 
which a newly elected MP decides that she will vote however her whips 
demand on any issue, not out of any kind of loyalty to the party or 
solidarity for her comrades, but simply because she wants to get promoted 
as quickly as possible in order to become a famous political figure. 
Although this decision would not obviously involve any malfeasance on 
her part, it is surely not the kind of decision that a politician of integrity 
would make; by renouncing her agency and judgement so 
comprehensively, she would be incapable of committing to the kinds of 
                                                 
5 The Labour MP Phil Woolas was found guilty of this in an especially unedifying 
episode during the 2010 election (Curtis 2010).   
6 The question of what we should conVLGHU FKHDWLQJ RQ RQH·V H[SHQVHV, rather than 
merely benefitting from the system, cannot be resolved merely by considering whether or 
not a politician did not explicitly violate the rules. ,W·s reasonably uncontroversial to see 
MPs flipping KRPHV RIILFLDOO\ FKDQJLQJ RQH·V SULQFLSDO UHVLGHQFH EHWZHHQ D /RQGRQ
address and a constituency home to avoid capital gains tax) in such terms. See Ludwig 
2009 for further discussion.   
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things that we expect the politician of integrity to stand for, even when 
this is difficult for them. In this sense, her desire for fame does not appear 
to be commensurate with the behaviour of the politician of integrity. Yet if 
this is correct, it appears that understanding political integrity purely in 
external, rule-adherence terms is inadequate, and that a plausible 
understanding of political integrity must work with a richer account of the 
unique ethical demands that holding political office makes.  
The failure of the Principles of Public Life to operate with a theoretically 
pristine account of political integrity is not surprising. Official ethics codes 
must be capable of generating robust, public assessments of conduct and 
the case of the MP introduced above is not susceptible to such assessment 
because of the epistemic difficulties of determining what motivates her 
behaviour from an external perspective. Moreover, such codes are chiefly 
concerned with sanctioning misconduct, and we might think that a desire 
for fame does not necessarily deserve to be sanctioned so long it does not 
involve gross negligence, or the misuse of public resources. However, we 
should not mistake the need for a public code that can be used to sanction 
misconduct with the theoretical question of the nature of the values that 
should inform our assessment of political conduct more broadly. There is 
a difference between the correct understanding of important political 
values and the rules or official codes of conduct we should adopt to 
encourage admirable behaviour.   
10 
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This is important to bear in mind. Many politicians claim that they have 
acted with integrity merely if they have avoided engaging in obvious rule 
breaking. I will now argue that such claims are hollow precisely because 
political integrity requires more than simply avoiding malfeasance. 
 
II 
As noted at the beginning of the article, it is problematic to view political 
integrity DVDPDWWHURIVWLFNLQJWRRQH·VPRUDOSULQFLSOHVRUFRPPLWPHQWV
by refusing to trade action on them tout court. However, it does not follow 
that principled commitment is irrelevant to such judgements. Indeed, I 
will now illustrate how WKH´LGHQWLW\FRQFHSWLRQµDssociated with Bernard 
Williams, which views integrity in strikingly different terms to those 
outlined in the Principles of Public Life, can enrich our understanding of the 
requirements of political integrity. There are some significant disanalogies 
EHWZHHQ :LOOLDPV·V HWKLFDO DFFRXQW DQG WKH SROLWLFDO DFFRXQW , GHYHORS
most notably because in politics consequences matter to our assessment of 
integrity, and this jDUVZLWK:LOOLDPV·V UHMHFWLRQRI FRQVHTXHQWLDOLVP%XW
despite this, I hope to persuade readers that thinking about political 
integrity in terms inspired by Williams is salutary. 
:LOOLDPV·V position is best understood via his discussion of a fictional 
George, who has just taken a PhD in chemistry, and is finding it difficult 
to get a job. George is informed by an older colleague that a position is 
available in a laboratory that researches chemical and biological warfare. 
11 
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He initially says that he cannot accept the job given his long-held 
opposition to chemical and biological weapons, but is asked to reconsider 
when it is pointed out that he needs money to support his family, and that 
if he declines the job will go to a contemporary not inhibited by his 
scruples (Williams, 1973, 97-98).  
Williams notes that most forms of direct utilitarianism would urge 
George to take the job and, for this reason, argues that utilitarianism 
cannot make sense of the value of integrity, because it fails to appreciate 
how projects and commitments are constitutive of our characters as they 
give meaning to our lives. Williams refers to such character defining 
commitmentVDVDSHUVRQ·VJURXQGSURMHFWV, and FODLPV WKDW ¶D man may 
KDYH«D ground project or set of projects which are closely related to his 
H[LVWHQFH DQG ZKLFK WR D VLJQLILFDQW GHJUHH JLYH PHDQLQJ WR KLV OLIH·
(Williams, 1981, 12-13). For Williams, our ground projects provide us with 
an understanding of our ethical identity by givinJXVD¶VHQVHRIcoherence 
DFURVV WLPH·, and being forced to give them up would cause the kind of 
¶SV\FKRORJLFDO IUDJPHQWDWLRQ· WKDW LV LQLPLFDO WR LQWHJULW\ (Ashford, 2000, 
422). At heart, this account suggests that integrity is a quality we admire 
because we think, at least in most cases, that ethical commitment is an 
admirable trait for a person to display, even if we do not happen to 
endorse thaWSHUVRQ·VFRPPLWPHQWV, because the person who is prepared 
to abandon their ethical commitments with ease displays a certain 
shallowness, and a life that evinces shallow commitment, or opportunism 
12 
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at every quarter, is one that displays the wrong kind of orientation toward 
the world.7 
We cannot seaPOHVVO\ DSSO\ :LOOLDPV·V ´LGHQWLW\ FRQFHSWLRQµ WR WKH
actions of political agents in order to make plausible judgements about 
political integrity. As noted already, it is simply untenable to claim that 
political integrity could be a matter of politicians standing for their 
deepest political commitments in a similar way that Williams conceives of 
HWKLFDOLQWHJULW\DVDPDWWHURIVWDQGLQJIRURQH·Vground projects. Politics 
frequently requires its practitioners to compromise on matters of principle, 
and insisting that the politician of integrity must refuse to trade action on 
their principled political commitments, ignores the fact that a politician 
who acted in this way would be incapable of securing any of the goods 
                                                 
7 ,EURDGO\DJUHHZLWK&DOKRXQWKDW:LOOLDPVHLWKHUKROGVWKDW¶the depth of character that 
FRPHVZLWKGHHSFRPPLWPHQWV LV DQDGPLUDEOH FKDUDFWHULVWLF RISHUVRQV·, RU WKDW ¶GHHS
attachments are part of any life that could count for us as a good, full, and flourishing 
KXPDQ OLIH·   :LOOLDPV·V FULWLFV KDYH FODLPHG that his account counter-
intuitively suggests that it would be better if certain people, like the evangelical racist, 
lacked integrity, and that this must be incorrect because if integrity is a value its 
ascription must be an indicator of our esteem. For these critics, committing to ground 
SURMHFWV FDQ RQO\ FRQIHU LQWHJULW\ LI VXFK SURMHFWV DFWXDOO\ KHOS DQ DJHQW WR OHDG ¶D
JHQXLQHO\PRUDOO\GHFHQWOLIH·$VKIRUG 
It makes intuitive sense to place some constraints on the set of ground projects that the 
person of integrity would pursue, although I make no attempt to settle the question of 
which constraints here. However, attempts to thoroughly moralise integrity are 
problematic because attributing integrity need not always signal moral approval. For 
H[DPSOH PRVW YLHZHUV RI +%2·V The Wire will attest that Omar Little is a person of 
integrity, despite the fact that he is a stickup artist who frequently engages in extreme 
violence, because he only targets people who are in the game. Yet moralised accounts, 
which insist that the person of integrity must pursue projects that are germane to living a 
´JHQXLQHO\ PRUDOO\ GHFHQW OLIHµ FDQQRW PDNH VHQVH RI WKLV MXGJHPHQW JLYHQ WKH
immorality of many of the acts Omar routinely engages in. In this sense, we ought to 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKDWFODLPVDERXWDQDJHQW·VLQWHJULW\RIWHQGRQRWVHUYHWRVLJQLI\WKDWWKH\
act in accordance with objective moral requirements, but rather make reference to 
whether or not they abide by various principled standards they consider to have ethical 
force. It is not unusual to fervently disagree with someone while admiring their moral 
resolve and character, and we commonly refer to such people as displaying integrity if 
they avoid flagrant opportunism, or selling-out, even if we reject the moral standing of 
their particular convictions. 
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that politics routinely provides.8 In this regard, the suggestion that any 
IRUPRIPRUDOFRPSURPLVHUHSUHVHQWVDEHWUD\DORIRQH·VSROLWLFDOintegrity 
looks worryingly close to the ethic of conviction that Max Weber rightly 
chides for being ill-suited to the political sphere. 
However, LWGRHVQ·WIROORZthat we must revert to thinking that political 
integrity is simply a matter of adhering to formal rules and avoiding 
malfeasance. Indeed, :HEHU·V FULWLFLVP RI FRQYLFWLRQ SROLWLFLDQV KDV
important implications for our understanding of how politicians can meet 
the requirements of their role along two key dimensions. First, Weber 
insists that some kind of commitment to a cause has to be manifested in 
political action for it to retain its normative character, because WKHUHLV¶QR
more pernicious distortion of political energy than « [the] worship of 
SRZHUIRULWVRZQVDNH·Weber, 1994, 354). If a politician does not display 
commitment to a political cause their actions, much like the actions of a 
person who has no ground projects, lack normative depth. Second, Weber 
is adamant that it is indecent to suppose that D SROLWLFLDQ·V VROH
responsibility is WR HQVXUH ¶WKDW WKH IODPH RI SXUH FRQYLFWLRQ«is never 
H[WLQJXLVKHG·, VRWKDW¶WRNLQGOHWKDWIODPHDJDLQDQGDJDLQLVWKHSXUSRVH
of his actions, actions which, judged from the point of view of their 
possible VXFFHVV«can and are only intended to have exHPSODU\ YDOXH·
(Weber, 1994, 360). For him, and his followers like Mark Philp, responsible 
SROLWLFLDQV GR QRW VHHN WR PDQLIHVW D ¶SXULW\ RI LQWHQWLRQ >ZKLFK@ LV
                                                 
8 $OWKRXJK&ULFN·VFODLPWKDWSROLWLFVLVWKHDFWLYLW\¶E\ZKLFKGLIIHULQJLQWHUHVWVZLWKLQD
JLYHQ XQLW RI UXOH DUH FRQFLOLDWHG· H[FOXGHV YDULRXV WKLQJV ZH VWDQGDUGO\ WKLQN RI DV
politics, it contains an important element of truth (2009, 7).  
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unconditioned by the need to compromise, negotiate, [or] exercise 
DXWKRULW\RYHURWKHUV·, because such a view is deeply anti-political (Philp, 
2007, 82).  Even if a politician is adamant that they have a true grasp on 
PRUDOLW\·VUHTXLUHPHQWV, UHIXVLQJWRZRUNZLWKWKH¶HWKLFDOLUUDWLRQDOLW\ of 
WKHZRUOG·:HEHU361) is a failing because it shows that they do not 
treat their convictions with the requisite practical seriousness; as 
commitments that have to be achieved through the political process. A 
politician who refuses to engage in any compromising activities is highly 
unlikely to materially advance their political causes. Such intransigence 
will, in all probability, ensure that they fail to further their professed 
political commitments. In this sense, refusing to compromise and 
negotiate with opponents on matters of principle can be seen as a refusal 
to grasp the demands of the role.9  
In this sense, a plausible conception of political integrity must recognise 
that admirable political conduct is not a matter of moral posturing, and 
that politicians should be prepared to compromise on matters of principle 
when this is likely to be the cost of their improving the political status quo. 
Once we grant that a functioning democratic polity requires politicians to 
compromise with one another, there is little reason to hold that 
compromises are inevitably unprincipled. They might instead be framed 
as the appropriate result of the democratic resolution of political disputes 
                                                 
9 A small number of political operators succeeded in transforming their societies while 
displaying such a purity of intention, but because so few succeeded by acting in this way 
I do not think they can be used to model effective political agency in general.          
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(Bellamy 2012).10 There is nothing paradoxical in holding that the 
politician of integrity should be committed to both their substantive 
political commitments, and the ethos of compromise and conciliation that 
undergirds democratic political life ² at least if we recognise, as we 
should, that values can conflict and that life is complicated.  
In addition, a suitably politicised version of the identity conception has 
to recognise that only certain kinds of commitment are integrity-conferring for 
politicians. Some ground projects, like devoting oneself to being a good 
father, have very admirable ethical dimensions but do not have the right 
object to confer political integrity. The politician of integrity stands for a 
special set of value commitments that are commensurate with the public 
role they serve; principles and aims concerning how they think political 
institutions and practices should be ordered if they are to bring about the 
good of the polity. At a minimum, political integrity therefore requires 
principled public-spiritedness. On this account, using political office to 
enrich oneself, sleep with as many interns as possible, or to rescue stray 
cats, regardless of how steadfastly one commits to these activities, is not 
integrity conferring, because such projects do not focus on the good of the 
polity in the requisite way. Of course, the distinction between value 
commitments which concern political institutions and the common good, 
                                                 
10 $V+ROOLVDUJXHV¶WKHSROLWLFLDQPXVWNHHSDNLQGRIIDLWKZLWKVHYHUDOJURXSVZKROD\
FRQIOLFWLQJFODLPVRIOR\DOW\RQKLP«FRQIURQWHGZLWKWKLVSOXUDOLW\RIDLPVDQGRIYDOXHV
DQGRIODQJXDJHVKHFDQRQO\SOHDGWKDWWKHEHVWLVWKHHQHP\RIWKHJRRG·(Hollis, 1983, 
396-97). This does not rule out the idea that one important consideration in our 
judgements about political integrity is whether or not a politician has stood for their 
deepest political commitments; it just suggests that we need to think about the conditions 
of successfully doing that in a suitably realistic manner.   
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rather than private ethical matters, is subject to dispute. Many projects, 
OLNH *HRUJH·V opposition to chemical warfare, clearly have political 
dimensions, and if they are pursued in a public way are likely to count as 
relevantly political. This is fluid territory.   
These claims about the appropriateness of compromise in politics and 
the object of identity-conferring political projects, should lead us to 
reformulate our understanding of the ethical demands that politics makes 
on its practitioners. Properly matching up to the role requires more than 
merely following official rules of conduct and avoiding malfeasance; it 
also demands a suLWDEO\UHDOLVWLFSXUVXLWRIRQH·VGHHSHVWSROLWLFDOFDXVHV
As such, political integrity requires a politician to stand for their deepest 
political commitments, while being flexible enough, and cognisant enough 
of their proper role, to recognise when concession, or perhaps even the 
renouncement, of certain commitments is called-for.  
Deciding what the political DQDORJXHVRI:LOOLDPV·VJURXQGSURMHFWVDUH, 
and when they may have been betrayed, is hard. A politician is likely to 
have an array of political commitments, some of which will be regarded as 
central by them, their party, or their constituents, and others of which will 
not. It is reasonably easy to accept that compromising on those which are 
not is unlikely to threaten their integrity.11 But it also seems that a 
politician may compromise on a core commitment without this 
automatically signalling a lack of integrity on their part, so long as such 
                                                 
11 It may not be easy to cleanly separate core and none-core commitments in practice. 
Moreover, one may begin to grasp where certain commitments fall in the process of 
political negotiation.   
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compromise was necessary to the successful pursuit of their other deep 
causes in the long term.12    
Evaluating political conduct in this way is inherently contentious. 
Consider the most resonant example in recent British political history, the 
/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWV·GHFLVLRQ WRYRWH WR LQFUHDVH WKH8QLYHUVLW\ WXLWLRQ IHH
cap after they formed a coalition with the Conservative Party, in 
contravention of their pre-election pledge to vote against any such 
legislation.13 In his book, 22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib Dem-
Conservative Coalition, David Laws argues that the suggestion that this 
decision can be used to impugn the SDUW\OHDGHUVKLS·V integrity rests on a 
misunderstanding of the options the party faced as the junior member of 
the coalition negotiations. Laws claims that The Liberal Democrats made a 
sensible political decision to prioritise four issues: the £10,000 personal tax 
allowance; the Pupil Premium; a sustainable economy; and electoral 
reform and argues, rightly, that they achieved success on all these 
dimensions (2010, 185-86).  
Laws is right that it is unreasonable to have expected the Liberal 
Democrats to have been in a position to enact the entirety of their 
                                                 
12 -RKQ0DMRU·VQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH,5$GXULQJWKHWURXEOHVLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG, despite 
WKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\·VSXEOLFO\VWDWHGUHIXVDOWRQHJRWLDWHZLWKWKHP, is an apt case in 
point.    
13 In their 2010 manifesto, the Liberal Democrats explicitly stated that the Party would 
¶VFUDS XQIDLU XQLYHUVLW\ WXLWLRQ IHHV IRU DOO VWXGHQWV WDNLQJ WKHLU ILUVW GHJUHH LQFOXGLQJ
those studying part-WLPHVDYLQJWKHPRYHUHDFK·DQGSURFODLPHGWKDWWKH\KDG¶D
financially responsible plan to phase fees out over six years, so that the change is 
DIIRUGDEOHHYHQLQWKHVHGLIILFXOWHFRQRPLFWLPHVDQGZLWKRXWFXWWLQJXQLYHUVLW\LQFRPH·
Moreover, 57 Lib-Dem MPs standing in the 2010 General Election signed the National 
Union of Students pledge to veto any such legislation, which had the following wording: 
´I pledge to vote against any increase in fees in the next parliament and to pressure the 
JRYHUQPHQW WR LQWURGXFH D IDLUHU DOWHUQDWLYHµ 6HH
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vote_for_Students_pledge  
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manifesto. As a result, questioning the party OHDGHUVKLS·V integrity on 
these grounds is irresponsible. Moreover, it is worth recalling that the 
party leadership were bound to this policy by their party even though 
they were against it, and that they had an obligation to act in a responsible 
manner, and to generate political stability, during a tumultuous period in 
recent history. Yet, despite the importance of these mitigating factors, any 
plausible judgement of this case must focus on the OHDGHUVKLS·V preceding 
actions. Once we focus on these, it is clear that while we cannot accuse the 
party decision-makers of lacking integrity simply because they failed to 
enact one of their manifesto commitments, we can do so for making the 
pledge, and for seeking to benefit from it, in the way that they did. The 
pledge was not merely presented as one manifesto commitment alongside 
a host of others, and one that any reflective Liberal Democrat voter, 
therefore, ought to have recognised as the possible subject of a future 
compromise were the party to enter into coalition negotiations. It had far 
more symbolic significance. By making the pledge in such trenchant 
terms, and then failing to abide by it, the party leadership systematically 
misled their supporters. This, rather than the act of compromising with the 
Conservative Party per se, explains why questioning their integrity is 
appropriate. 
$FWLQJZLWKLQWHJULW\E\VWDQGLQJIRURQH·Vdeep political commitments 
is important in both an internal and external sense. From the internal 
perspective, if a politician is elected having presented themselves as a 
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sincere advocate of policy q, and instead votes for p out of fear of the 
tabloid press, this is a normatively significant because by voting for p they 
fail to display the right kind of commitment to their convictions which, in 
turn, leads us to question their character and resolve. From an external 
standpoint, by voting for p she also lets down the people who voted for 
her. This external dimension matters greatly because her actions are in 
tension with some basic features of representative politics. In a democracy, 
representatives are supposed to be the agents of ordinary citizens: they are 
meant to be the ones choosing which commitments need to be pursued. 
This is ZK\RQH·VUHODWLRQWRSDVWFKRLFHVLVRIWHQOLNHO\WRPDWWHUmore with 
UHJDUGWRRXU MXGJHPHQWRIDSROLWLFLDQ·VLQWHJULW\WKDQRXU MXGJHPHQWRI
DQ RUGLQDU\ DJHQW·V LQWHJULW\, not that it is unimportant in that domain. 
For example, if a politician had said she would vote for q even if she was 
not especially committed to q and unsure of T·Vmerits, once the decision 
has been made she would display a lack of integrity by voting for p, 
because once a politician has publicly committed to a position it should be 
seen through. In politics, you have to wear your choices.  
However, it is a mistake to collapse our understanding of political 
integrity into this set of external concerns. This is because although seeing 
WKURXJK RQH·V FDPSDLJQ SURPLVHV LV GHHSO\ LPSRUWDQW LW LV QRW WKH RQO\
WKLQJ WKDW PDWWHUV IURP WKH VWDQGSRLQW RI D SROLWLFLDQ·V LQWHJULW\
Politicians DOVRKDYHDUROH WRSOD\ LQUHVWUDLQLQJ ¶XV IURPRYHUKDVW\DQG
ill-advised methods of getting what we want, while prodding us to pursue 
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difficult and farsighted projects whose worth we might not see on our 
RZQ·6DEO9-10). Moreover, there are likely to be a host of decisions 
politicians will have to make once they have been elected, on which they 
did not express any opinion during their campaign, and which were not 
DGGUHVVHG LQ WKHLU 3DUW\·V PDQLIHVWR In these scenarios, we expect the 
politician of integrity to stand for their convictions in a politically serious 
way, rather than giving in to the temptation to trade on them for various 
personal rewards, or to capitulate in the face of opposition. This is why it 
makes sense to distinguish between politicians of integrity who display 
abiding commitment to causes and others who, although they do not 
violate any of the formal rules or obligations which apply to them, merely 
either operate with a careerist worldview, or engage in some kind of 
ideology-free managerialism.  
 
III 
In the last section, I argued that principled commitment plays an 
important role in our judgements about political integrity but that our 
understanding of principled commitment must cohere with a suitably 
realistic conception of politics. Successful politicians may also have to 
commit various other morally disreputable acts that may lead us to 
TXHVWLRQ DQ RUGLQDU\ DJHQW·V moral integrity. Successful politicians may 
not be able to avoid lying, making coalitions with groups whose causes 
they disapprove of, and, more generally, adopting a kind of 
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consequentialist reasoning that we would find objectionable in private life 
(Williams, 1981, 58). As Stuart Hampshire·VGHIHQFHRIexperience suggests, 
the morally innocent who wish to maintain an unsullied soul lose their 
way in politics because of the sometimes squalid, and always morally 
imperfect, context in which they must act (Hampshire, 1989, 170). 
Successful politicians consequently have to exhibit a kind of toughness that 
we do not expect many other actors to display (Galston 1991).  
While this may be regretful, it should not lead us to question a 
SROLWLFLDQ·V LQWHJULW\ LI we can reasonably judge that such actions are 
necessary for them to further their deepest political convictions. Yet in 
cases where compromises on deep commitments, or other morally 
questionable acts are called-for, there is reason to think that the politician 
of integrity will only act with a particular kind of reluctance. As Williams 
notes, such reluctance serves two important purposes. First, from a 
pragmatic perspective, it seems that ¶Only those who are reluctant or 
disinclined to do the morally disagreeable when it is really necessary have 
much chance of not doing it when it is not necessary· (Williams, 1981, 62). 
Second, from a more ethical vantage point, it is the right attitude to adopt 
given the real moral costs such political decisions have; even if an act is 
the correct thing to do all-things-considered, it can still involve some wrong 
(Williams, 1981, 61). Hence, the politician of integrity must be prepared to 
compromise on matters of principle, and to act with the requisite 
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toughness, but they must also do so reluctantly and remain sensitive to the 
moral costs of their actions. This is, undoubtedly, challenging.   
Politicians will often have to choose which of their commitments to 
prioritise in a given context, and this decision is likely to be conditioned 
both by the strength of their endorsement and basic strategic 
considerations. Two key points follow. First, that the refusal to fall victim 
to wishful thinking about what can be achieved is an epistemic virtue 
politicians of integrity must display. Second, as the dirty hands literature 
suggests, good political leaders may often have to act in direct 
contravention of some of their deepest convictions to avoid serious 
disasters (Walzer 2007). Given that political integrity is a matter of 
EDODQFLQJ WKHGHPDQGVRIRQH·V UROH, DQGRQH·VGHHSFRPPLWPHQWV, such 
decisions do not necessarily EHWUD\ RQH·V SROLWLFDO LQWHJULW\, because 
avoiding great disasters is one of the most central role-based obligations at 
play. 
Once we appreciate that responsible political commitment is 
diachronic, there is also scant reason to hold that thinking in these terms 
requires us to endorse a worryingly rigid account of commitment, so that 
if a politician renounces a previous political commitment this necessarily 
signals a lack of integrity on their part.14 For example, the British Labour 
3DUW\·V UHQXQFLDWLRQ RI &ODXVH ,9 a longstanding the commitment to 
nationalisation), may not have immediately compromised the integrity of 
Labour Party MPs because nationalisation, as a principled commitment, 
                                                 
14 Contrary to the views of Sabl 2002, 27 (drawing on Luban).   
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may have become ill-suited to the historical context in which the Labour 
Party had to act. In contrast, the extent to which the Blairite takeover may 
have radically altered the fundamental ends the Party pursued, and 
therefore changed its identity, potentially compromising the integrity of 
Labour Party MPs who remained committed to some form of socialism, is 
a much tougher question. If it did, avowed socialist MPs would have 
stood for a platform that directly repudiated their deepest political 
convictions. Nonetheless, a justification of the decision to remain a party 
member is possible, because it is not unreasonable to think that the Labour 
Party remained the best avenue for pursuing progressive politics in the 
United Kingdom. If it was, the decision to remain in the tent pissing-out can 
be presented as a responsible political judgement which resisted the 
temptation of moral posturing. 
When thinking about the nature of political integrity, we have to 
operate with a resolutely realistic conception of political possibility. Mark 
Philp offers a penetrating account of how this commitment should 
influence our assessment of political conduct, and therefore our 
assessment of values like integrity which underwrite it, when he 
DGGUHVVHV1\H%HYDQ·VGHFLVLRQ WRDJUHH WR WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRIDSULYDWH
GLPHQVLRQLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP·V1DWLRQDO+HDOWK6HUYLFH1+6ZKHQ
it was created in the aftermath of World War II. When assessing this 
decision, Philp insists that we have to ask tough questions about whether 
or not Bevan could have brokered a better deal; one that would have been 
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equally enduring and not immediately revoked if the Conservative Party 
won the next election, as they did. This enables us to question how far 
%HYDQ ¶ZDV FRPPLWWHG WR WKH LGHDOV LQ WKH QDPH RI ZKLFK WKH 1+6 ZDV
SURSRVHGDQGKRZIDUKHUHPDLQHGFRPPLWWHGWRWKRVHREMHFWLYHV«ZKLOH
accepting tacticaOFRQFHVVLRQV·3KLOp, 2010, 479). Knowing that the Labour 
Party lost the 1951 election matters because it illustrates WKDW%HYDQ·VWDVN
was to establish a fixed baseline of universal provision before Labour lost 
power, and as this baseline has proved resilient in the face of some 
determined political opposition, %HYDQ·V DFKLHYHPHQW LV laudable (Philp, 
2010, 479).  
This enables us to see that strategic concessions need not necessarily 
FRPSURPLVH D SROLWLFLDQ·V LQWHJULW\ HYHQ LI WKH\ violate cherished 
principles. Yet, something of a puzzle arises when we take the necessity of 
strategic concession making seriously. If the NHS had been quickly 
GLVPDQWOHGGHVSLWH%HYDQ·VYDULRXVFRQFHVVLRQV for reasons outside of his 
control, should our judgement of his political integrity change? In one 
regard, it seems that it should not. Surely, the key question is whether or 
not a politician made a reasonable judgement at the time, by thinking 
about whether or not a strategic compromise on an issue of principle was 
likely to advance the long-term prospects of their political causes. If this 
hope was thwarted for reasons beyond their control, LVQ·W LW overly harsh 
to impugn their character by doubting their integrity? 
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Although this line of thought has some intuitive appeal, there is reason 
to think that how events turn out should affect DSROLWLFLDQ·Vretrospective 
judgement of their agency. Consider the case of a politician whose 
momentous political decisions failed to further their political causes, but 
who succeeded in silencing their internal doubts about their conduct by 
telling themselves their choices were perfectly reasonable decisions to 
make at the time. If such self-assurance does not strike us as the right kind 
of response to political failure, this implies that admirable self-assessments 
RIRQH·VDFWV LQSROLWLFVDVHOVHZKHUH often utilise a conception of agent-
regret which is not constrained by our assessment of whether or not a 
decision was ex ante reasonable.15  
For example, when discussing his decision to support the US-led 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Tony Blair poses the following question:  
Had we foreseen what Iraq was going to be like following the removal of 
Sadaam, would we still have done it? Should we still have done it? Many 
would say no. The cost in money and blood has been enormous.   
My response however, is very clear. Had this money and bloodshed been 
H[SHQGHGLQUHPRYLQJ6DGDDP,ZRXOGDJUHH%XWLWZDVQ·W,WZDVODUJHO\
expended in dealing with the consequences of [Iranian and Al-Queda] 
extremism whose aim was not to implement the will of the Iraqi people, but 
to defy it.  
What are we saying when we ask: Look at the bloodshed, how can it be 
ZRUWK LW" )LUVW FRQVLGHU ZKR LV UHVSRQVLEOH ,W ZDVQ·W 8. RU 86 VROGLHUV
There was no inevitability about the violence. These were deliberate acts of 
                                                 
15 In his work on moral luck, Williams argues that denying the existence of this kind of 
agent-UHJUHW IDOVHO\ VXJJHVWV WKDW ¶ZH PLJKW LI ZH FRQGXFWHG RXUVHOYHV FOHDU-headedly 
HQRXJKHQWLUHO\GHWDFKRXUVHOYHVIURPWKHXQLQWHQWLRQDODVSHFWVRIRXUDFWLRQV«DQd yet 
VWLOOUHWDLQRXUFKDUDFWHUDVDJHQWV·+HGHQLHVWKLVLVSRVVLEOHEHFDXVH¶RQH·VKLVWRU\DVDQ
agent is a web in which anything that is the product of the will is surrounded and held 
up and partly formed by things that are not in such a way that reflection can only go in 
one of two directions: either in the direction of saying that responsible agency is a fairly 
VXSHUILFLDO FRQFHSW«RU HOVH WKDW LW LV QRW D VXSHUILFLDO FRQFHSW EXW WKDW LW cannot 
XOWLPDWHO\EHSXULILHG· (Williams, 1981, 29-30).  
As I have argued that the person of integrity knows who she is and what she stands for 
by acting in the world to further her deepest projects, the link between cogent 
judgements of integrity and an adequate account of the nature of agency should be clear.     
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sabotage. Had we conceded to them, we would have strengthened the wider 
ideology they represented. By refusing to concede and by supporting Iraqi 
democracy, we struck a blow against that ideology everyZKHUH« 
All I know is that I did what I thought was right. I stood by America 
when it needed standing by. Together we rid the world of a tyrant. Together 
ZHIRXJKWWRXSKROGWKH,UDTL·V right to democratic government (Blair, 2010, 
479).  
 
Even if we set aside the YHUDFLW\ RI %ODLU·V HPSLULFDO judgements, it is 
hard read this passage and to not find his refusal to take responsibility for 
the consequences of his decision deeply disreputable. Is it so disreputable 
that it ought to lead us to question his integrity? Possibly. If we accept that 
political commitment cannot merely serve exemplary value, and that 
admirable politicians refuse to pass responsibility on to the world rather 
than owning it themselves, it appears that politicians who do not feel deep 
painful agent-regret when their actions do not succeed in furthering their 
political causes evince the wrong kind of response to their political failure 
as well as a bad understanding of the costs that politics has inflicted on 
them. In an ironic twist, there are consequently grounds for holding that 
admirable politicians will recognise that their integrity can be threatened 
by events that are outside of their control and for which they should not, 
necessarily, be morally blamed.16 
 
IV 
At heart, SROLWLFDO LQWHJULW\ LV PDWWHU RI VWDQGLQJ IRU RQH·V GHHSHVW
commitments in a politically realistic way, without violating the 
                                                 
16 Admittedly, this claim is very controversial and my argument far from conclusive, but I 
find this is a plausible extension of my view even if it is not a logical entailment of it.  
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distinctive role-based obligations that apply to holders of public office. We 
cannot construct an ´LQWHJULW\-algorithmµ that can definitively tell 
politicians how to do this. Nor is it possible to legislate for this conception 
of integrity in toto, even though suitably robust public-ethics codes can 
sanction certain actions which reflect a lack of political integrity along 
some of the dimensions discussed. Rather, politicians must use their 
judgment, and weigh the relevant factors at play in a responsible manner 
when deciding how to act with integrity. Likewise, as external observers 
we must focus on the considerations I have outlined, and make a 
judgement about whether or not a politician appropriately took them into 
account with reference to a host of complex contextual factors. As such, 
HYDOXDWLRQVRISROLWLFLDQ·V LQWHJULW\DUH LQKHUHQWO\PHVV\. We may decide 
that a politician acted with integrity even if they violated some of the 
official rules of conduct we normally think they ought to abide by, so long 
as they did so in service of an admirable, public-spirited commitment.     
0\DFFRXQWVXJJHVWVWKDWDSROLWLFLDQ·VLQWHJULW\can be threatened in at 
least four directions. First, a politician can engage in various kinds of 
malfeasance or misconduct and therefore act in violation of the public 
trust that is placed in them. Second, they may sell-out their commitments 
for various kinds of personal gain, or capitulate too easily in the face of 
political opposition. Third, political integrity is vulnerable to a kind of 
under-reaching which occurs when a politician does not try sufficiently 
hard to achieve their political commitments by refusing to engage in any 
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compromises on matters of principle, regardless of the likely unsuccessful 
political results of this decision. Fourth, and admittedly much more 
controversially, once we accept that intentions are not the only things that 
matter, it seems that a related thought might apply to the problem of over-
reaching. If a politician engages in various compromises on matters of 
principle, in the hope that they will later be in a better position to pursue 
their ends, but this hope ends up being frustrated, our assessment of their 
political integrity will be coloured, because they will not have achieved 
the right kind of coherence between their commitments and their agency.   
With the exception of cases of the first sort, or especially egregious cases 
of selling-out or capitulation in the face of opposition, convincing 
judgements about political integrity will often require us to avoid the 
temptation of thinking in clear-cut, black-and-white terms. Most 
politicians will trade on some of their convictions in the hope being able to 
better advance their deepest political causes in the long run. This is why 
SROLWLFVLVDVWDQGLQJWKUHDWWRLWVSUDFWLWLRQHU·VLQWHJULW\political decisions 
are VXEMHFWWRWKHDFWLRQVRIRWKHUSHRSOHDQGHYHQWVEH\RQGRQH·VFRQWURO
Conversely, some compromises on matters of principle may be 
ouWZHLJKHG E\ D SROLWLFLDQ·V VXFFHVVHV LQ VXFK D ZD\ WKDW WKHLU VHQVH RI
themselves, and their commitment to their fundamental political 
convictions, remain reasonably intact.  
If political integrity is understood in this way, it should be painted as an 
achiHYHPHQW EURXJKW DERXW E\ ODXGDEOH GLPHQVLRQV RI D SROLWLFLDQ·V
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character and some degree of luck. In many cases, our judgements about a 
SROLWLFLDQ·V LQWHJULW\ FDQ RQO\ EH YLQGLFDWHG IURP D UHWURVSHFWLYH
standpoint when judging a long train of action, and will often be 
contentious because such commitment is rarely helpfully understood in 
all-or-nothing terms. To this end, as with many other key topics in 
political ethics, thinking realistically about the nature of political integrity 
requires us to resist the siren-song of simplistic moral hectoring and to 
instead think in shades of grey.  
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